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Using Hawkins's Surround, Field, and Frames Concepts to
Understand the Complexities of Special Measures Decision
Making in Crown Court Trials
Samantha Fairclough*
Adjustments to criminal trial processes, called special measures, are
available to vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses giving evidence.
Findings from interviews with 13 criminal practitioners suggest that
there are notable variations in the uptake of special measures between
prosecution witnesses, defence witnesses, and the accused in Crown
Court trials. These extend beyond any inequality in their legal provi-
sion. This article uses Keith Hawkins's conceptual framework of
surround, field, and frames as a heuristic device to understand this
differential uptake. The framework delineates the various factors ±
including the socio-political, organizational, and attitudinal ± which
can influence decision-making practices in relation to special
measures. In doing so, this article demonstrates two things. First, that
changing the legal provision is unlikely to effect much change in
practice, absent specific complementary changes to the field. Second,
that Hawkins's framework has potential as an explanatory device in
decision-making contexts outside his own health and safety setting.
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INTRODUCTION
The special measures scheme enacted by the Youth Justice and Criminal
Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) provides a series of adjustments to the
traditional way of testifying in criminal trials.1 The aim of this provision is to
enable vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses to give their `best evidence'2
in court. In statutory terms, this means to improve the evidence's quality
with regard to its completeness, coherence, and accuracy.3 Traditionally, the
`adversarial package'4 ± the combination of rules requiring a witness to give
evidence orally, in open court, in the presence of the defendant ± had erected
often insurmountable barriers to hearing evidence from children and other
vulnerable witnesses5 in criminal proceedings. This impeded the system's
ability to convict those who offend against these groups.6
Special measures enable the vulnerable and/or intimidated to give
evidence from behind a screen (out of sight of the dock and public gallery);
via a live link (from a room outside the courtroom); and/or with the
assistance of an intermediary (a specialist communication expert).7 Under
the YJCEA, vulnerable witnesses include those who are young (under 18) or
with a mental health problem or learning disability.8 Intimidated witnesses,
including complainants of sexual offences, are those in fear or distress in
connection with testifying in the proceedings.9
Vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses, including the accused, can
secure special measures. However, there are some differences in the legal
provision of them to the accused when compared to that for non-accused
witnesses. The first difference is the source of legal authority for special
measures. The accused was initially excluded from the statutory special
measures regime.10 The provision of special measures to them has been
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1 For the full history of special measures provision, see R. Marchant, `Special
Measures' in Vulnerable People and the Criminal Justice System, eds. P. Cooper
and H. Norton (2017) 333.
2 Home Office, Speaking up for Justice: Report of the Interdepartmental Working
Group on the Treatment of Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses in the Criminal
Justice System (1998) para. 1.7.
3 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA), s. 16(5).
4 J. Spencer and M. Lamb (eds.), Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change
the Rules? (2012) 1.
5 J. Spencer, `Child Witnesses and Cross-examination at Trial: Must it Continue?'
(2011) 3 Archbold Rev. 7.
6 A. Sanders et al., Victims with Learning Disabilities: Negotiating the Criminal
Justice System (1997) 39, at 57; NSPCC, Child Abuse Trends in England and Wales
1983±1987 (1989); Lord Pigot, Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence
(1989).
7 This is not a complete list of the special measures provision: see YJCEA, op. cit., n.
3, ss. 23±30.
8 id., ss. 16 and 33A.
9 id., s. 17.
10 id., ss. 16 and 17.
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achieved through more gradual, ad hoc ± and `grudging'11 ± reforms. As a
result, the common law largely governs special measures provision for the
accused12 with only one statutory provision (for live link) in force.13
A further difference in the special measures provision relates to its extent.
The provision to the accused is often inferior to that for non-accused
witnesses, as the following three examples indicate. First, unlike for wit-
nesses, the live link provision for the accused is not available to those with
physical disabilities14 or those in fear or distress in connection with
testifying in the proceedings. Second, unlike child witnesses, child defen-
dants are not automatically entitled to give evidence by live link. Instead,
there must be a causal relationship between their age and their inability to
participate effectively as a witness in the proceedings.15 Third, the provision
of intermediaries to the accused has long been plagued with funding and
resource issues.16 A more recent tightening of their availability in law, under
the Criminal Practice Directions17 and by the Court of Appeal in R v.
Rashid,18 makes the disparate provision yet further pronounced.
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11 Hoyano argues that the government has given `only grudging recognition [to the
needs of defendant witnesses] when forced to do so on ECHR art. 6 grounds': see L.
Hoyano, `Reforming the Adversarial Trial for Vulnerable Witnesses and
Defendants' [2015] Criminal Law Rev. 107, at 126±7.
12 Screens via R v. Waltham Forest Youth Court [2004] EWHC 715 (Admin) [31];
intermediaries via C v. Sevenoaks Youth Court [2009] EWHC 3088 (Admin); and
other measures such as the removal of wigs and gowns via the Criminal Procedure
Rules and Criminal Practice Directions.
13 YJCEA, op. cit., n. 3, s. 33A for live link as inserted by the Police and Justice Act
2006, s. 47. There is also an unimplemented statutory provision for intermediaries
for the accused (s. 33BA, YJCEA, inserted by s. 104, Coroners and Justice Act
2009).
14 Though the Court of Appeal in R v. Hamberger [2017] EWCA Crim 273, para. 12
noted that, despite this, the courts can make various of adjustments in accordance
with the Criminal Procedure Rules to ensure the trial is fair. This approach was
criticized in P. Cooper's Case Comment [2017] Criminal Law Rev. 708, at 710.
15 See, further, S. Fairclough, ` `` It doesn't happen . . . and I've never thought it was
necessary for it to happen'': Barriers to Vulnerable Defendants Giving Evidence by
Live Link in Crown Court Trials' (2017) 21 International J. of Evidence and Proof
209, at 211.
16 See E. Henderson, `A Very Valuable Tool: Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries
discuss the Intermediary System in England and Wales' (2015) 19 International J.
of Evidence and Proof 154; P. Cooper and D. Wurtzel, `A Day Late and a Dollar
Short: In Search of an Intermediary Scheme for Vulnerable Defendants in England
and Wales' [2013] Criminal Law Rev. 4, at 16.
17 Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Criminal Practice Directions (October 2015 edn,,
amended April 2016) 3F.12. For critical discussion, see L. Hoyano and A. Rafferty,
`Rationing Defence Intermediaries under the April 2016 Criminal Practice
Direction' [2017] Criminal Law Rev. 93.
18 See R v. Rashid [2017] EWCA Crim 2; D. Wurtzel, `Intermediaries for Defendants:
Recent Developments' [2017] Criminal Law Rev. 463 at 469±70.
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Notwithstanding this legal disparity, the position adopted in this article is
that the existing provision of live link, screens, and intermediaries19 to the
accused is sufficiently established20 for them to be invoked by (at least
some) vulnerable defendants giving evidence in criminal trials. This is
particularly so given the evidence that shows the prevalence of vulnerability
among defendant and offender populations. For instance, the Children's
Commissioner Report highlighted that 60±90 per cent of the offending
population suffer from communication disorders compared with just 5±7 per
cent of the general population.21 Furthermore, Cunliffe et al. found that 36
per cent of surveyed prisoners had a disability and/or mental health prob-
lem.22 This research thus explores an insight into the use of special measures
in practice, using data from interviews with 13 criminal practitioners on their
experiences of special measures use in Crown Court trials. These data
provide the first insight into special measures practice for the accused and
other witnesses for the defence.23
The practitioners experienced a stark disparity (going far beyond the legal
disparity24) in the use of special measures. It was much less likely, in their
experience, that the defence would invoke special measures, whether for the
accused or a defence witness. In seeking to understand why they had
experienced this notable inequality in practice, this article adopts Keith
Hawkins's conceptual framework of surround, field, and frame25 as an
analytical tool. The framework helps us to delineate the various factors,
outside of the legal provision itself, which affect prosecutorial and defence
460
19 The empirical research on which this article is based predates the April 2016
tightening of the availability of intermediaries to the accused.
20 This is not to say that this provision is, itself, sufficient: see S. Fairclough `Speaking
up for Injustice: Reconsidering the Provision of Special Measures through the Lens
of Equality' [2018] Criminal Law Rev. 4±19.
21 N. Hughes et al., Nobody Made the Connection: The Prevalence of Neurodisability
in Young People Who Offend (2012) 23.
22 C. Cunliffe et al., `Estimating the prevalence of disability amongst prisoners: results
from the Surveying Prisoner Crime Reduction (SPCR) survey' (2012) 141. See,
further, J. Jacobson et al., Structured Mayhem: Personal Experiences of the Crown
Court (2015) 19; A. Wigzell et al., The Youth Proceedings Advocacy Review: Final
Report (2015); J. Jacobson with J. Talbot, Vulnerable Defendants in the Criminal
Courts: a review of provision for adults and children (2009) 7; J. Talbot, `Fair
Access to Justice?' (2012) Prison Reform Trust briefing paper.
23 Previous studies have focused on prosecution witness uptake. For example, see P.
Roberts et al., `Monitoring Success, Accounting for Failure: The Outcome of
Prosecutors' Applications for Special Measures Directions under the Youth Justice
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999' (2005) 9 International J. of Evidence and Proof
269; C. Charles, Special Measures for Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses:
Research Exploring the Decisions and Actions taken by Prosecutors in a Sample of
CPS Case Files (2012).
24 Discussed further in Section II.
25 K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory
Agency (2002).
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special measures decision making. By using Hawkins's framework in this
way, the article demonstrates its potential as an explanatory device in
contexts outside of Hawkins's own research setting of health and safety
regulation.
It is argued that the socio-political context in which the law developed and
operates, as well as the way in which the criminal justice system is
organized, affects the extent of discretion that prosecution and defence
practitioners have over special measures decisions. This, in turn, affects the
primacy of the law itself in the way that these practitioners frame matters as
they move towards a decision. This is an important finding, particularly
given the Law Commission's recommendations for statutory parity in the
provision of live link and intermediaries to the accused.26 If, as this article
argues, the legal provisions are not the sole driving force behind defence
special measures decisions, then it follows that changing the law is unlikely
to be sufficient to effect change in practice. In order to change current
practice, it is argued that the implementation of any legal reform will need to
be accompanied by additional changes to the way in which the legal field is
organized.
The structure of this article is as follows. The first section outlines the
methods employed in this research, including an overview of how Hawkins's
conceptual framework serves as an analytical tool in this context. The
findings from the interviews with criminal practitioners are then discussed in
section II. To understand the disparate practices highlighted in the inter-
views, the main body of the article uses Hawkins's surround, field, and
frames concepts to understand special measures decision making and its
implications in Crown Court trials.
I. METHODOLOGY
This research is based on 13 semi-structured interviews with criminal
practitioners practising in various Crown Court centres across the Midlands
circuit. Interviews were conducted between November 2014 and April 2015.
The research project sought to gain an insight into the use of special
measures by all vulnerable and/or intimidated participants involved in
Crown Court trials. For the purposes of this article, the data are analysed
with regard to the apparent differences in the decision-making process of
advocates when the vulnerable/intimidated individual is a witness for the
prosecution or is the accused.
Access to the criminal practitioners interviewed in this study was obtained
through two gatekeepers ± a legal gatekeeper and an academic gatekeeper
461
26 Law Commission, Unfitness To Plead. Volume 1: Report (2016) Law Com no. 364,
paras. 1.33±1.35.
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with contacts in the profession. The provision of `purposive selection
criteria'27 ensured the sample included respondents with a range of post-
qualified experience (PQE), from different parts of the profession, with
experience of prosecuting and defending serious criminal offences including
sex, violence, drugs, and murder. The sample comprised five solicitors, four
barristers, and four recorders (barristers who also sit as part-time judges).28
Of these eight barristers, four were Queen's Counsel. The PQE of the
respondents ranged from six to 35 years. Their collective PQE totalled 244
years, with a mean experience of 18 years and 9 months. Table 1 shows the
characteristics of each individual respondent.
The data from these interviews provide an insight into the working lives
of these practitioners and the operation of the law of special measures in
Crown Court trials. The sample of those interviewed, whilst not sufficient in
size to make generalizations to the entire legal profession,29 is able to ground
an exploratory analysis. Similarly to Temkin's research on prosecuting and
defending rape, in which she interviewed just 10 barristers, the small sample
in this research remains `sufficient to reveal a number of important issues'30
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Table 1. Respondents' characteristics
Identifier Queen's Prosecution/defence PQE
Counsel workload split
B1 50/50 22
B2 80/20 14
B3 YES 40/60 20
B4 40/60 21
R1 YES 85/15 35
R2 YES 80/20 13
R3 50/50 18
R4 YES 50/50 19
DS1 0/100 15
DS2 0/100 34
DS3 0/100 18
CPS1 100/0 9
CPS2 100/0 6
27 J. Ritchie et al., `Designing and Selecting Samples' in Qualitative Research
Practice, eds. J. Ritchie and J. Lewis (2003) 97.
28 Comments are attributed to the respondents using identifiers (see Table 1) to keep
their identities anonymous while providing sufficient information so that their views
can be evaluated.
29 L. Webley, `Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research' in The Oxford
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, eds. P. Cane and H. Kritzer (2010) 934.
30 See J. Temkin, `Prosecuting and Defending Rape: Perspectives from the Bar' (2000)
27 J. of Law and Society 219, at 221.
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surrounding special measures decision making for Crown Court trials. The
data should thus be regarded as providing merely a `snapshot of . . . practi-
tioners' experiences'.31
Hawkins's theoretical framework of surround, field, and frames is
adopted in this article as a tool of analysis for understanding practitioners'
decisions regarding special measures. This article does not claim that
Hawkins's framework is the only, or even the best, way of making sense of
the respondents' experiences. However, its accessibility as a theoretical
device, coupled with its inclusion of the macro-, micro-, and meso-level
factors at play in decision making make it an attractive choice.
The theoretical perspective underpinning Hawkins's framework is one
grounded in naturalism. It is thus acknowledged that `legal decisions . . . are
not made in a vacuum, but in a broader context of demands and expectations
arising from the environment in which the decision-maker lives and
works.'32 For Hawkins, this framework helped to unpack the decision-
making processes of those regulating health and safety breaches and, in
particular, to understand when and why they chose to prosecute such
breaches. In the special measures context, its use helps us to understand
when, and if so which, special measures are applied for, and why (or why
not).
The three layers of Hawkins's framework ± the surround, the field, and
frames ± are in `mutual interaction',33 meaning that changes in one level can
affect the operation of the others in a non-linear and non-hierarchical way.
The surround is the broad social, political, and economic context in which
decision making takes place.34 The decision field is set within the social
surround, and is the `legally and organisationally defined setting in which
decisions are made.'35 For the purposes of this article, therefore, the field is
the criminal justice system and, more specifically, the parts of it which relate
to the preparation for and realities of Crown Court trials. Relevant issues
thus include the structure of the legal profession; the available resources; and
the bureaucratic processes and guidance with which practitioners should
comply.
The final level of Hawkins's conceptual framework is decision frames.
These are `structure[s] of knowledge, experience, values, and meaning that
decision-makers employ in deciding.'36 The decision frames applied in the
special measures context are the instrumental, moral, organizational, and
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31 F. Garland and J. McEwan, `Embracing the Overriding Objective: Difficulties and
Dilemmas in the New Criminal Climate' (2012) 16 International J. of Evidence and
Proof 233, at 239.
32 Hawkins, op. cit., n. 25, p. 31.
33 id., p. 52.
34 id., p. 27.
35 id.
36 id., p. 52.
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legal frames. These are conceptualized at the relevant junctures of this
article. The use of just four frames in this analysis should not be interpreted
as a claim that these ways of framing matters relating to special measures
decisions are exhaustive. Rather, and in the same vein as Hawkins, these four
frames are considered the `leading examples of disparate forms of framing'37
as indicated by the respondents.
II. FINDINGS
The interview findings that relate to the use of live link, screens, and inter-
mediaries are discussed in this article. Pre-recorded video testimony is
omitted from the analysis, since there are significant issues in terms of its
utility and practical accessibility for the defence that do not exist for the
prosecution.38 Figures 1 and 2 display the findings. The references to `direct
use' in Figure 1 are to trials in which the respondents participated, through-
out their careers, where a vulnerable and/or intimidated witness/accused
used special measures. Figure 2 depicts the respondents who were aware of
trials in which a vulnerable and/or intimidated witness/accused has used
special measures, but in which they had no direct involvement. The data in
Figure 2 provides an indication of broader practices outside of the
respondents' own direct experiences and should be treated with caution.
Prosecution and defence non-accused witnesses are grouped together in
this initial presentation of these findings, since this mirrors the way they are
treated under the YJCEA. The difference in the 13 respondents' experiences
of trials in which non-accused witnesses had used special measures,
compared to when the accused had, is clear. Special measures were invoked
much less frequently for the accused.
As illustrated in Figure 1, only two respondents had been involved in
trials where there was successful implementation of the live link for the
accused (B1 and B4) and two where the accused gave evidence from behind
a screen (B4 and DS1). Four respondents had been involved in a trial where a
vulnerable defendant gave evidence with the assistance of an intermediary
(B1, B3, R1, and R3). There were only two other respondents, as shown in
Figure 2, who knew of a trial (in which they did not participate) where the
defendant gave evidence by live link (R3 and DS1), and a further two who
knew anecdotally of an intermediary assisting a defendant (R2 and B2). By
contrast, all of the respondents recalled their involvement in multiple trials
where witnesses other than the accused used special measures. They were
also aware of multiple cases, in which they were not personally instructed,
where the same was true.
464
37 id., Preface, p. x.
38 This is discussed further in Fairclough, op. cit., n. 20, p. 16, fn. 94.
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Some of the differential uptake is likely to be attributable to the unequal
legal provision of special measures to accused/non-accused participants.
Another plausible reason for the differential uptake is the fact that defen-
dants are not compellable as witnesses, which reduces the number of them
who give evidence (and so can use special measures). Notwithstanding these
differences, the provision of special measures to the accused, and the
frequency with which they do give evidence in their defence,39 are still
465
Figure 1. Number of respondents recalling direct use
Figure 2. Number of respondents aware of use in other trials
39 Zander and Henderson found that 70 to 74 per cent of defendants gave evidence in
their defence even before the erosion of the right to silence (Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act 1994): see M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Crown Court Study
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sufficient to reasonably expect a higher uptake of special measures among
this cohort. It is thus argued that the substantial disparity in uptake between
accused and non-accused witnesses, as experienced by the respondents in
this research, requires an explanation which extends beyond the narrower
legal provision of special measures to the accused.
The need for such an explanation is further indicated by a distinction
which emerged within the interviews regarding special measures use by
prosecution witnesses and non-defendant defence witnesses. For these
witnesses, there is legal parity in their provision. However, the experiences
of those interviewed indicate that this is not reflected in practice. For
prosecution witnesses, the use of special measures was reported as somewhat
routine:
I think they are now regarded, certainly by judges and advocates, as an
anodyne commonplace now. [R4]
. . . they are considered to be usual measures rather than special measures these
days. [CPS1]
They are routinely applied for. [DS1]
The experience was not the same regarding defence witness use:
[I] can't recall a case where special measures have been applied for for
defence witnesses. I can envisage circumstances where it would be perfectly
proper, but I've not known it arise . . . Far more common for prosecution. [R1]
I've never seen a special measures application for a defence witness. [R2]
. . . I do find it a bit odd that [special measures] haven't been incorporated in
the way they might for defence witnesses. [R3]
. . . I've seen far fewer [special measures applications] from the defence. [R4]
In summary, not only is the uptake of special measures between the accused
and non-accused notably disparate (where there is disparity in the law), but
this is also the case between prosecution and defence witnesses (for whom
the law is equal). Again, it is probable that there are fewer defence witnesses
called (in the same way that there are fewer accused giving evidence), and so
some difference in uptake is to be expected. However, as evidenced from the
above quotations, the disparity the respondents experienced in the use of
special measures between non-accused witnesses in practice, is sufficiently
striking to suggest that an explanation for this is needed which extends
beyond these quantifiable differences.
The remainder of this article seeks to develop just such an explanation,
using Hawkins's conceptual framework of surround, field, and frames. The
analysis concentrates on a comparison between making decisions about
special measures for the accused and for prosecution witnesses. The data
466
(1993). Now that adverse inferences can be drawn from silence, the number of
defendants testifying in their trials may be greater still.
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also shed some light on the position occupied by non-accused defence
witnesses, but since this was underexplored in interview, a complete assess-
ment of their position is not undertaken. The frames concept is explored first,
drawing specifically on the insights provided in the interviews. It is follow-
ing this, when considering why practitioners may frame their decisions in
these ways, that the significance of the legal field and socio-political
surround come into focus.
III. HAWKINS'S DECISION FRAMES
As noted in section I, framing is a prerequisite to deciding how to act and
why. Decision frames are `a means by which factors are selected and their
meaning in decision-making is organised'.40 Analysis of the data indicated
that four decision frames were especially influential in practitioners' deci-
sions regarding whether to apply for special measures. Three mirror those
used in Hawkins's work on health and safety regulation: the instrumental
frame, organizational frame, and legal frame.41 The fourth is the moral
frame, which Oakley developed when using Hawkins's framework in her
doctoral work to understand the complexities of decision making in the
context of policing missing persons.42
1. Instrumental frame
Hawkins states that decision makers who `seek to achieve instrumental
effects frame problems . . . in terms of the expected likelihood of correction,
repair, or other indicators of reductive effectiveness.'43 Instrumental frames
in the special measures context thus relate to the impact of special measures
on the evidence elicited. Two matters arise in relation to this. The first is
criminal practitioners' perceptions of the purpose of special measures (and
thus whom they might assist). The second brings tactical concerns about
evidence quality and jury perceptions to the fore.
(a) General purpose of special measures
Despite the legislative purpose of special measures as improving the evid-
ence's quality, it became apparent in interview that criminal practitioners
viewed the purpose of special measures, at least some of the time, as simply
to secure witness attendance:
467
40 Hawkins, op. cit., n. 25, p. 48.
41 id., pp. 282, 305, 380.
42 E. Oakley, `Policing the Missing: Negotiating Absence' (2014) PhD thesis,
University of Bristol, 88.
43 Hawkins, op. cit., n. 25, p. 282 (emphasis added).
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It's always easier to get a witness there if you tell them that they've got special
measures. [CPS2]
They're [special measures] certainly useful at securing a witness's attendance
in the first place. And so I guess by definition they have to improve their
evidence because it exists. [R4]
Securing defendant attendance does not present the same challenges, since
the accused is ordinarily present at their trial.44 Framing special measures as
tools to get witnesses to court ± in order to secure any evidence from them ±
can render them superfluous for an already present accused:
[Defendants] are there ± it's not like `well if I get the special measures I'll
come to court'. That's really why most people have special measures for the
prosecution ± it's to get the witness there. The defendant has no choice ±
they're there whether they want to be or not. [B2]
However, the accused's presence in court does not mean they will give
evidence. A vulnerable accused might opt out of testifying out of fear or
anxiety. As shown in the next section, few respondents seemed to view the
live link and screens as tools to secure evidence from an already present
defendant.
(b) Specific purpose of special measures
The respondents in this research often framed the live link as a measure that
keeps a witness out of the courtroom.45 This made it difficult for many to
recognize the potential value of the live-link provision for a vulnerable and/
or intimidated accused:
[Defendants] never [give evidence] over live link because they're in court for
the entirety of the proceedings anyway, so it almost makes a mockery of them
being in court and then going out to give their evidence over live link. That's
how the courts see it. [R2]
If [defendants] are [in court] anyway then something like live link would be
irrelevant. [B3]
Examples of when the live link could be beneficial include when an accused
person is suffering from (among other things) ADHD or an anxiety disorder.
Giving their evidence via a live link, away from the multiple stimuli in the
courtroom, has obvious benefits here.46 However, only two of the respon-
dents had secured live link for their clients (B1 and B4). Despite prompting
in interview, only one other respondent recalled thinking that a vulnerable
defendant in a case in which they were involved `would [have been] much
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44 Criminal Practice Directions, op. cit., n. 17, 14E.3 requires that trials on indictment
are only continued in the absence of a defendant if it is a step which is unavoidable.
45 Mirroring findings from M. Hall, `Children giving evidence through special
measures in the criminal courts: progress and problems' (2006) 21 Child and Family
Law Q. 65, at 67.
46 See, further, Fairclough, op. cit., n. 15, p. 219.
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more at ease if he could have given his evidence from somewhere that
wasn't in open court' [CPS1].
The majority of the respondents in this research viewed the accused's
presence in court throughout the trial as nullifying any potential need to leave
to give evidence by live link. Underpinning this belief was an assumption that
a familiarity with the courtroom and those within it, obtained by sitting
through the prosecution case, would negate any such need:
. . . when the defendant won't be giving his evidence until at least half way
through a trial . . . he's had to sit and have the family [of the complainant] . . .
making sure they get the best seats to stare at him, and so when he gets to the
witness box . . . it's almost a given that by then he will be used to all the
staring, etc. The tomatoes have been thrown for three weeks; one more isn't
going to matter. [R3]
Sitting in the dock [defendants] get used to the court atmosphere and the
people in court. [R1]
To sit passively47 in court is a markedly different task, however, from that of
giving evidence. This difference is no doubt magnified if the accused is
vulnerable and/or intimidated. It is probable that this remains true even if the
accused is a repeat player in the courtroom.48 Yet, because of the attitudes
documented above, many vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants are
likely to be left to (attempt to) give evidence in their trial without assistance.
Criminal practitioners also seemed to frame screens in a way that mini-
mized their perceived utility for the accused. They were seen as a measure
that primarily shields the dock (and thus defendant) from the witness' view:
I don't think screens would help [defendants] because the whole idea of
screens is you're screened from the defendant. [R2]
There's no need to screen the defendant from the dock . . . [B4]
Most practitioners interviewed seemed unaware of the potential value of
shielding the accused from the public gallery. This could be warranted in a
variety of situations due to, for instance, the attendance of the complainant's
family or rival gang members making testifying more difficult, particularly
for those suffering from anxiety disorders. The fact that screens are often49
framed as tools to keep a witness out of sight may shape a judge's decision to
refuse an application for screens for an accused. This was DS3's experience:
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47 And often also disengaged: see A. Bottoms and J. McClean, Defendants in the
Criminal Process (1976) 66; A. Kirby et al., `Effective participation or passive
acceptance: how can defendants participate more effectively in the court process?'
(2014) Howard League What is Justice? WP 9/2014, 6±10; Jacobson et al., op. cit.,
n. 22, p. 12.
48 Bottoms and McClean, id., p. 56.
49 The notable exception to this is where one co-defendant testifies against another (B4
had applied for a screen for the accused in this situation).
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I have applied [for screens] and failed for a defendant . . . the answer came
back, `well he's been sat in the dock, he's already been identified, and if there
were going to be any repercussions there would have been, I can't see how it
makes a difference to his evidence'. [DS3]
In summary, the way that some criminal practitioners frame, first, the
purpose of special measures generally ± as tools to secure witness attendance
and testimony; second, the purpose of the live link ± as a measure to keep
witnesses out of the courtroom; and third, the purpose of screens ± to protect
a witness from the defendant, means that often they may be seen as irrelevant
to the accused.
Intermediaries, however, have been framed as the measure which is `more
obviously useable' [B1] by the accused. They are viewed as suitable for
addressing communication difficulties among all vulnerable participants:50
Intermediaries are seen to really help defendants; it's helping him to
understand the question and it's helping the jury to understand the answer.
It's made us all so aware of what better advocates we've got to be. [B2]
I've got no issue with the intermediary scenario because if some people are
vulnerable and have problems then they require assistance. [CPS2]
(c) Tactical impact of special measures
Another way in which special measures decisions are instrumentally framed
is with regards to their perceived impact on the jury's perception of a witness
or accused. For example, the accused's presence in court gave rise to a clear
concern among those interviewed that their use of the live link ± requiring
them to leave the courtroom to give evidence ± would ignite jury distrust or
misunderstanding of their client:
It's going to look odd if at trial you have a defendant sitting in the dock who
then goes out of court to give evidence to the jury. [R1]
. . . the jury would be thinking `why on Earth has he done that?' [B2]
Similar tactical concerns were raised when prosecution witnesses gave their
evidence by live link (or from behind a screen) and then sat in the public
gallery for the remainder of the trial:
I think there would be a perception that it's an odd thing to do. If one of the
grounds for using live link is that you don't want to be in court, and then you
go and sit in court and watch, it creates a question of how appropriate the use
of the special measure was in the first place. [R1]
The [prosecution witnesses] want this special measure, they want that special
measure. And then they turn up in the bloody public gallery to watch [the
defendant] give evidence. Some public galleries are upstairs and out the way
so OK fine, but where the jury can see ± urgh. And I swear to god [the jury]
thinks `well what was all that about then? She can't be that scared'. [R3]
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These concerns arise because, as discussed in the previous subsection, the live
link is framed as a measure which keeps witnesses out of court, and screens as
a measure which keeps witnesses out of complete sight of the dock and public
gallery. Structural differences in the trial proceedings (resulting in the
accused sitting in court throughout the trial) mean that this is more frequently
a live issue for the defence. Prosecution counsel can manage the situation by
advising witnesses not to sit in court if they have given evidence by live link
or screens. The same is not true of the defence where the accused is
concerned. Given the central role of the jury in Crown Court trials, lawyers
are naturally keen to avoid creating a negative impression of their witnesses
or clients.51 For the defence, this can mean avoiding these measures.
(d) `Best evidence'
With regards to the live link, further tactical concerns exist relating to the
quality of the evidence when elicited in this way. The predominant belief
among the respondents in this research is that `best evidence' constitutes that
which is elicited live, in court, in front of the jury. This is because it is
believed to have the most impact. The respondents in this project thus saw
the live link ± removing a witness from the courtroom to give his or her
evidence ± as diminishing the evidence's impact:52
A witness giving evidence by TV link doesn't have as much impact as one
giving evidence in court. [DS2]
. . . the cynical approach and the way I sometimes adopt it is you get much
more impact when the witness is in the room . . . the jury can actually get a
sniff of her; smell her. It's much more impactful. [B2]
Research into the accuracy of the legal profession's perception regarding the
impact of live-linked evidence remains inconclusive.53 Nevertheless, the
way that the perception manifests itself is that the use of live link in Crown
Court trials is often avoided where possible, by advocates for both the
prosecution and the defence:
I don't think defence barristers would ever consider giving evidence via live
link because you lose that personal connection . . . you want your client to . . .
have that connection with the jury and have them feel some form of empathy.
[R2]
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51 This may be addressed with a judicial direction.
52 For similar findings, see Temkin, op. cit., n. 30, p. 237; Roberts et al., op. cit., n. 23,
pp. 285±6; M. Burton et al., `Protecting children in criminal proceedings: parity for
child witnesses and child defendants' (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Q. 397, at
404.
53 Discussed further in L. Ellison and V. Munro, `A `` Special'' Delivery? Exploring the
Impact of Screens, Live-Links, and Video-Recorded Evidence on Mock Juror
Deliberation in Rape Trials' (2014) 23 Social and Legal Studies 3, at 8.
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I doubt that many lawyers will apply for defendants to give evidence by live
link . . . there's something very useful in humanising the defendant . . . And
sometimes, the best way to do that is stick them in the witness box opposite the
jury and have them be themselves. [DS3]
. . . if I'm involved in a case from the start I always say `any chance he or she
[prosecution witness] will be cross-examined with a screen, please' . . . Screen
is my preference than live link. Most people I know, if they're prosecuting,
prefer screens. [R3]
When deciding for which special measure to apply, the `best evidence' frame
is an important consideration. An advocate may decide that they will apply
for special measures yet, on these tactical grounds, still seek to avoid the live
link specifically.
2. Moral frame
Evidence from interviews in this research suggests that Oakley's moral
frame54 may also be applied by some criminal practitioners when making
special measures decisions. This concerns the type of support (if any) that it
is felt a vulnerable and/or intimidated court user deserves.
Some of the respondents in this research indicated the existence of a
presumption of guilt within the legal profession. This can mean that the
accused is treated as if they have committed the crime with which they are
accused, rather than the inverse as the presumption of innocence requires.55
This finding is consistent with existing research. For instance, McConville et
al. argued that `the presumption of guilt . . . assume[s] a universalistic
character and is unthinkingly applied to the client population at large.'56
Newman's observations of legal aid solicitors mirrored these findings. He
noted that clients were `routinely discussed and approached . . . as if they
were guilty.'57 Alge's research into defence barristers similarly revealed that
some members of the legal profession exhibited a dismissive attitude
towards defendants and perceived them as guilty in interview.58
In the context of special measures decisions, it appears that the existence
of a presumption of guilt can manifest itself in two ways. The first is that it
may act as a barrier to viewing an accused as vulnerable:
472
54 Oakley, op. cit., n. 42.
55 See H. Packer, `Two Models of the Criminal Process' (1964) 113 University of
Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1, at 12; A. Ashworth, `Four Threats to the Presumption of
Innocence' (2006) 10 International J. of Evidence and Proof 241, at 243.
56 M. McConville et al., Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices of
Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (1994) 140±1.
57 D. Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (2013) 47.
58 D. Alge, `The Effectiveness of Incentives to Reduce the Risk of Moral Hazard in the
Defence Barrister's Role in Plea Bargaining' (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 162, at 175.
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. . . if it's in the Crown Court then [judges are] not particularly sympathetic.
They're of the view `well you've committed a serious offence, you can't be
that vulnerable'. That's the prevailing view. [R2]
Brown argues that transgressive activity or behaviour can potentially lead to
the withdrawal of vulnerability status,59 or even difficulty attaining the status
of vulnerable at all.60 If the reason for the criminal trial is perceived to be the
accused's own misconduct, then criminal practitioners may struggle to view
the accused as vulnerable.61
The second way that the presumption of guilt can manifest itself is that
practitioners may view the accused as undeserving62 of special measures,
regardless of perceptions as to their vulnerability status:
But obviously, if [the defendant's] been accused of doing something, should
he be afforded the benefits of the people who are alleging they have been
assaulted or raped or whatever? I've a tendency to say no . . . [CPS2]
R3 also indicated the existence of the view that an accused is undeserving of
special measures support even where that accused is a child:
The problem with special measures [for defendants] is . . . he's the defendant
. . . `If he's old enough to commit the crime, he's old enough to do the time'
attitudes. This sort of thing is inescapable, but not enough is done to neutralise
it. [R3]
If such attitudes towards young and otherwise vulnerable defendants exist ±
meaning they are not seen as deserving of special measures support due to their
position as the accused ± then framing special measures decisions morally may
result in an absence of adequate support to them if they give evidence.
The impact of the presumption of guilt can also affect the way decisions
about special measures for prosecution witnesses are made:
. . . it's easier for the prosecution to prove [vulnerability], because they can say
`this is what happened to my client'. [B2]
Presuming the accused is guilty may thus serve to bolster a prosecution
witness's (particularly a complainant's) application for special measures.
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59 K. Brown, Vulnerability and Young People: Care and Social Control in Policy and
Practice (2015) 86.
60 id.
61 This has also been found of police officers: see R. Dehaghani, `Vulnerable by law
(but not by nature): examining perceptions of youth and childhood `` vulnerability''
in the context of police custody' (2017) 39 J. of Social Welfare and Family Law 454,
at 462±3.
62 Brown, op. cit., n. 59, p. 86.
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3. Organizational frame
Organizational frames are those which define what is expected of a criminal
practitioner and thus how they demonstrate their competence within the
confines of the available resources.63 The organizational frames seemingly at
play in special measures decision making are quite different for the prose-
cution and the defence, because the context in which they operate means
they are subject to different expectations.64 For the defence, the use of
special measures may demonstrate incompetence, whilst the converse is true
for the prosecution. These organizational frames are discussed in turn,
starting with the defence.
(a) `Insurance-net' frame
One defence solicitor interviewed in this research suggested that competent
defence advocates should not need to outsource support for a vulnerable
client by applying for special measures. Instead, and in order to demonstrate
their competence, they should adequately prepare their clients for trial
themselves:
. . . special measures are an insurance net, just in case [the defendant isn't] very
good and because the lawyer can't deal with [the defendant's vulnerability]
personally. So I think that's why I think less about special measures; because I
would like to think that any competent defence lawyer will prepare a client
they think is vulnerable well for giving evidence. [DS1]
If special measures are framed as devices for incompetent defence lawyers,
this may result in defence lawyers avoiding making such applications.
Framing special measures in this way was seemingly endorsed in Lord Chief
Justice Thomas's decision in R v. Rashid.65 He ruled that, `in the over-
whelming majority of cases', the defendant can be assisted to give his or her
best evidence through `competent legal representation and good trial
management'.66
The expectation, therefore, is perhaps that defence advocates will ensure
that special measures are not needed. A `failure' to do so, evidenced by an
application for special measures, may thus signify their own (alleged)
incompetence as a defence lawyer.
(b) Bureaucratic frame
The expectations on prosecution lawyers regarding witnesses are markedly
different to those relating to the defence. The expectation, from external
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64 See Section V below.
65 R v. Rashid [2017] EWCA Crim 2.
66 id., para. 73 (Lord Thomas).
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sources as well as from within the criminal justice system,67 is that special
measures are applied for and secured when a prosecution witness is
vulnerable and/or intimidated. Indeed, the legislative provisions for special
measures themselves contain some powerful presumptions that special
measures will be secured for children and complainants of sexual offences.68
The application process for special measures for witnesses other than the
accused starts with the police, who are prompted to consider whether the
witness requires special measures when completing their witness statement
form (MG11). If they decide that such support is needed, the police must
then complete an MG2 form detailing why special measures are required and
which ones(s). In doing so, the police should seek the witness's view. This
information is then passed onto the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) with
the case file. If the CPS decides to charge the suspect, then the details of this
are recorded on the MG3 form along with any information about vulnerable
and/or intimidated witnesses and their special measures preferences. Young
notes in the context of legal aid that such prompt-laden form filling
`focus[es] the attention of [those applying] on the factors which the law
states must be taken into account'.69
The existence of these forms, and the prompts for special measures
consideration on them, reminds practitioners of the expectation that they will
secure special measures where required. It is through adequate completion of
the forms, and the resulting application for special measures for prosecution
witnesses ahead of the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing, that criminal
practitioners acting for the prosecution demonstrate their competence. This
has led to practitioners for the prosecution framing special measures
decisions bureaucratically, through the lens of these various administrative
processes created to ensure special measures are sought ahead of the trial:
There's become rather a bureaucratic and unthinking attitude towards special
measures. Box-ticking. `You're a witness; you know you can have special
measures; which one do you want?' without really thinking about whether they
need them. [R2]
There is a tick box [for special measures] on the [Plea and Case Management]
form; but I think routinely the CPS tick yes and defence tick no, and it's
almost become nothing more than a routine now. [DS1]
As will be discussed later in section V, the early bureaucratic processes
simply do not exist for the defence.
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67 This relates to Hawkins's concepts `surround' and `field' and is discussed fully in
section V below.
68 YJCEA, op. cit., n. 3, ss. 21, 22A.
69 R. Young, `Will Widgery Do?: Court Clerks, Discretion, and the Determination of
Legal Aid Applications' in Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the
Defence of Liberty, eds. R. Young and D. Wall (1996) 146.
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4. Legal frame
The legal frame concerns whether an issue can be transformed into a matter
the law deems relevant.70 In other words, is a witness' or client's vulner-
ability such that they can legally qualify for special measures? Similarly to
the organizational frames, the legal frame appears to operate rather dif-
ferently for the prosecution and defence. For the prosecution, the legal frame
is somewhat embedded within the bureaucratic frame, via the `MG' forms.
The defence does not have a comparable bureaucratic frame within which
the legal frame sits. Instead, defence practitioners are required to turn
directly to the legal framework to see whether a client is eligible for special
measures support. The legal provisions are scattered between statute and
various common law sources. This, by comparison, makes the legal frame
less readily accessible to those representing the accused.
Evidence from the interviews with criminal practitioners highlighted a
further issue in relation to the legal frame for the defence. Some criminal
practitioners were not aware that the legal provision for special measures
existed for the accused.71 Two notable examples derive from respondents
with 34 years' PQE and 21 years' PQE respectively:
I didn't think [special measures] were available [to defendants]? [DS2]
I think the live link should be available [to defendants]. [B4]72
Of course, a logical prerequisite to applying the legal frame is that practi-
tioners are aware of the available legal provisions. This insight highlights
that in some cases defence practitioners may not know there is a decision to
make regarding special measures, because they are not aware of the available
legal framework73 for their vulnerable client.74
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70 Hawkins, op. cit., n. 25, p. 380.
71 This issue is discussed further in Fairclough, op. cit., n. 15, pp. 215±17. The lack of
awareness is despite the fact that the available provisions are set out in Criminal
Practice Directions, op. cit., n. 17, referring practitioners to the Advocate's Gateway
toolkits for further guidance.
72 B4's comment was particularly interesting since she had been involved in a trial
where the accused had given evidence by live link, but did not know the statutory
provision to do so existed. Instead, she secured its use at trial under the judge's
inherent power (the existence of which was expressly denied in R v.Waltham Forest
Youth Court [2004] EWHC 715 (Admin), para. 82, and affirmed in R v. Ukpabio
[2007] EWCA Crim 2108, para. 14).
73 This mirrors findings from the Youth Proceedings Advocacy Review: see Wigzell et
al., op. cit., n. 22, p. 31.
74 Existing research also indicates a more prevalent problem with the identification of
vulnerability: see Fairclough, op. cit., n. 15, pp. 217±18.
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IV. FRAMING OVERVIEW
The previous section illustrates how Hawkins's decision-frame concept is
useful in understanding the ways in which decision makers (criminal
practitioners) make sense of and organize factors in decision making when
faced with a vulnerable and/or intimidated participant. The way these frames
interact appears to be rather different for the prosecution and the defence,
thus explaining their differential uptake.
Prosecution decision frames appear to independently lean towards
positive special measures decisions. For instance, it is clear how special
measures can be instrumental in assisting a witness (whether by getting them
to court and securing their evidence or, more specifically, keeping them out
of the courtroom/out of sight of the defendant). Prosecution witnesses may
also be viewed as more morally deserving of such additional support due to
their oppositional position to the accused. Further, the organizational frame ±
within which the legal frame is embedded ± renders securing special
measures for vulnerable/intimidated prosecution witnesses an essential part
of demonstrating competence as an advocate. There is, therefore, some
positive alignment of the decision frames. While this alignment is not
necessary for a special measures application to be made, its existence does
mean that it is much more likely that it will be. This is because each of the
ways a special measures decision may be framed serves to mutually
reinforce that opting for special measures is preferable.
The defence is not expected to apply for special measures; in fact, the
reverse is true ± special measures may instead be perceived as demonstrating
professional incompetence. Other than in the case of intermediaries (which is
plagued with resource issues75), the practical utility of special measures such
as live link and screens is much less obvious for an accused. This, combined
with a perception that the jury would treat defence evidence given in these
ways suspiciously, further deters applications for special measures. The way
the matters relevant to special measures decisions for the defence are framed
appear to present reasons not to apply, and less obvious reasons to apply.
This negative alignment of the defence decision frames makes special
measures applications for the accused less likely.
It is thus argued that even if the law were changed for the accused ± to
make the provision of special measures the same as that for non-accused
witnesses ± it would be unlikely to affect the way decisions on special
measures for the accused are made. This is because the legal framework is
only one of the causal influences at play. Unless a defence practitioner can
see positive reasons to do so, it seems unlikely that the legal frame will be
applied at all.
Using Hawkins's frame concept provides valuable insights into the
complexity of special measures decision making. Alone, however, the frame
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concept lacks sufficient explanatory power to help us understand, for
example, why the expectations placed on the defence and prosecution (and
thus the organizational frames and priority of the law within them) are
different. What Hawkins's surround and field concepts allow for is the
practitioners' decision making to be set in its wider context.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SURROUND AND FIELD
The YJCEA was enacted at a time when the government was keen to
position itself as the champion of victims' interests.76 Responding to
lobbying from `victim movement' groups,77 and media and public concern
about the system's ability to reliably convict the guilty,78 it both legislated to
improve the position for victims and took steps to ensure the legislation was
put into practice. A series of evaluation studies, conducted by the Ministry of
Justice and the Home Office,79 thus scrutinized the implementation of the
YJCEA. These studies placed external pressure from the surround on those
working within the system to ensure that they applied for special measures.
The failure to provide special measures for those who qualify has also
been scrutinized when things have gone wrong. For example, a Serious Case
Review investigated the suspected suicide of a complainant of sexual assault
(Mrs A) after she refused special measures and gave evidence at her abuser's
trial.80 The review cast shadows on the CPS and the trial judge, stating that
special measures should have been put in place even against the com-
plainant's will.81 The expectation that special measures are secured for
qualifying prosecution witnesses is thus enforced through this intense
scrutiny from within the surround.
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76 The New Labour government's 1997 election manifesto highlighted that `victims of
crime are too often neglected by the criminal justice system'. Government policy
thus centred increasingly on `putting victims at the heart of the criminal justice
system': Labour Party, `New Labour: because Britain deserves better' (1997); Home
Office, Justice for All (2002; Cm. 5563).
77 C. Lewis and J. Tapley, `Victims' Rights or Suspects' Rights?' in Debates in
Criminal Justice: Key Themes and Issues, eds. T. Ellis and S. Savage (2012) 219.
78 See Spencer, op. cit., n. 5, p. 7; D. Garland, The Culture of Control (2001) 154.
79 See, for example, B. Hamlyn et al., Are Special Measures Working? Evidence from
surveys of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses (2004); M. Burton et al., Are
Special Measures for Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses working? Evidence
from the criminal justice agencies (2006); R. McLeod et al., `Court Experiences of
Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities and Limited Mental
Capacity Report 1: Overview and Recommendations' (2010) MoJ Research Series
8/10.
80 See P. Walker, `Frances Andrade killed herself after being accused of lying, says
husband' Guardian, 10 February 2013.
81 H. Brown, The death of Mrs A: A Serious Case Review (2014) for Surrey
Safeguarding Adults Board, 49.
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This pressure from the surround has shaped the organization of the legal
field. The expectation that special measures are secured for prosecution
witnesses is placed on both the organizations involved (such as police and
CPS) and the individuals working within those organizations. One con-
sequence of this has been the production of extensive best practice guidance
and training opportunities.82 Another is the production of the MG forms,83
with embedded special measures prompts, which need to be completed by
the police and CPS as cases progress through the system.84
The scrutiny of special measures uptake limits the discretion available to
the prosecution when making decisions. So too does the paper trail of `MG'
forms. The requirement that the police and CPS comply with these bureau-
cratic processes helps to ensure cases are set up along a track on which
special measures will be secured.
The fact that the application process starts so early for the prosecution
makes it a process of `serial decision-making'.85 This is because the power to
make the decision about special measures is dispersed across different
individuals in the process:
[A] decision by an individual frequently does not settle matters (though a
particular individual may set a case on a particular course which will lead,
inexorably, to a particular destination), but merely makes a decision that leads
to a case being handed on to another individual or organisation.86
There appears, then, to be an element of `prosecutorial momentum'87 at play
in the special measures process, whereby counsel for the prosecution
essentially becomes a decision confirmer rather than a decision maker. The
momentum arises because it is more difficult to reverse an early decision made
by the police/CPS than it is to reach a different decision in the first place. Early
decisions made may thus `close off or profoundly restrict the choices open to a
later decision maker.'88 One of the respondents in this research attested to this:
In one sense, special measures, once it gets to counsel, is always a fait
accompli. You're instructed to ask . . . [R3]
This may also be the case in terms of the selection of specific special
measures. Early discussions between a witness, the police and the CPS
regarding special measures preferences can dictate which special measures
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82 For example, MoJ, Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on
interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance on using special measures (2011);
The Inns of Court National Training Programme 2016±2018.
83 This is an example of a `communication format', which functions to shape activity:
see K. Haggerty and R. Ericson, Policing the Risk Society (1997) 31±8.
84 The CPS itself commissioned research into compliance with these MG forms and
processes, see Charles, op. cit., n. 23.
85 Hawkins, op. cit., n. 25, p. 32.
86 id.
87 A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (1994) 228.
88 Hawkins, op. cit., n. 25, p. 34.
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counsel applies for at trial. This is further reinforced through witness con-
versations with agencies such as Victim Support and the Witness Service.89
Counsel for the prosecution may find that their witness has been `promised'
various special measures support ahead of trial:
Well it's very easy isn't it? If you're employed in a witness care capacity, and
you've got a domestic violence victim saying I don't want to come to court
and give evidence . . . The best thing for them to do is to turn round and go
`well actually we can offer you special measures'. [CPS2]
I think [prosecution witnesses] can be over-promised things by certain
agencies, to be honest. I think they are told `don't worry you'll get special
measures, you won't have to see him, you won't have to be in the same room
as him' sort of thing. I think where our fault as an organization comes is
sometimes, unless it's patently obvious, we do not think about the special
measure we are trying to obtain. [CPS1]
All of this serves to severely limit a prosecution advocate's level of dis-
cretion in relation to special measures. It also helps us to understand why
many vulnerable and/or intimidated prosecution witnesses still give their
evidence by live link,90 despite the large consensus among barristers that the
best, most impactful evidence is that which is delivered live in court. Agents
working at various stages of the serial decision-making process have dif-
ferent priorities. At the early stages of the process, the priority is to get a
solid case to the CPS, in part by securing willing witness testimony via
whichever means are available, with little (if any) regard for the impact of a
particular special measure on the perceived impact of evidence at trial.
For the defence, the socio-political surround and the organization of the
legal field are very different. The concern for victims coincided with a
frustration with the system's ability to convict the accused.91 According to
Jackson, there is a `clear instrumental connection between concerns for
victims and concerns about catching and punishing offenders.'92 The plight
of the victim came to be exploited as a political tool to increase the
punitiveness of the system.93 The use of `(re)balancing'94 in criminal justice
policy depicted defendants' and victims' rights as in conflict with each other,
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89 One effect of these conversations is to create an additional level of expectation on a
prosecution advocate to secure special measures, which comes directly from the
witness.
90 Though there are other reasons. The respondents in this research were keen to note
that when very young children are involved, it is accepted and understood that the
live link might be the only means necessary to secure evidence.
91 I. Edwards, `An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice
Decision Making' (2004) 44 Brit. J. of Criminology 967, at 970.
92 J. Jackson, `Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?' (2003)
30 J. of Law and Society 309, at 311.
93 See K. Roach, `Four Models of the Criminal Process' (1999) 89 J. of Criminal Law
and Criminology 671, at 703±6; Jackson, id.; Edwards, op. cit., n. 91, p. 970.
94 Home Office, op. cit., n. 76.
ß 2018 The Authors. Journal of Law and Society published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cardiff University Law School
meaning that to be for victims you have to be against defendants. This zero-
sum policy game, where `the offender's gain is the victim's loss',95 resulted
in the perception that accused's due process rights run contrary to the
popular concern for protecting victims, and keeping the public safe.96 This is
a perception that has enjoyed longevity ± it existed prior to the enactment of
special measures for non-defendant witnesses, and arguably remains
prevalent in the surround today.
It is therefore unsurprising that the accused was excluded from the remit
of special measures legislation. Special measures provisions have since been
awarded to vulnerable defendants on the grounds of human rights.97 In
contrast to the MoJ-led research regarding the uptake of special measures for
prosecution witnesses, there has been a distinct lack of research on their
implementation for the accused. In fact, the present study proffers the only
available insight into the use of live link and screens by vulnerable accused
witnesses.
As a result, the organization of the legal field for issues pertaining to
defence special measures is entirely different. Training courses and materials
for judges and barristers do not focus on the potential for special measures
use with the accused, being centred instead on witness vulnerability.98 There
are no pre-court bureaucratic processes with which the defence should
comply. Nor do external agencies such as the Witness Service discuss
special measures options with accused parties. There is thus no expectation
on the defence ± from the surround, the field, or from vulnerable clients
themselves ± to secure special measures. This leaves the defence with
untrammelled discretion over how to proceed, meaning that tactical concerns
over the presentation of the defendant's evidence can be prioritized over
concerns for the accused's welfare at trial.99
Two additional points of relevance regarding the organization of the
defence lawyer's legal field relate to resources. The first concerns inter-
mediaries. The legal provision for intermediaries is via the common law,100
since the legislative provision is yet to be implemented.101 This has given
rise to difficulties both in terms of funding and sourcing an appropriately
qualified intermediary to match the needs of a vulnerable accused.102 The
Ministry of Justice has no obligation to provide funds in the absence of
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statutory power.103 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal disallowed payment
for defendant intermediaries from the central funds.104 This means that
securing intermediary funding for a vulnerable accused is difficult:
. . . funding is an issue, sadly. I've seen it before where people we think are
vulnerable and [judges] say no you're fine get on with it ± issues about defence
paying for it or the court paying for it. [R2]
The difficulty you then get is how you fund it. Because it's not yet in statute
form there's this desperate, stupid fudge where I think the Legal Services
Commission pay for the preparatory work (the preliminary interview with the
intermediary getting to know you, the intermediary's report) and when it gets
to court the Ministry of Justice have an agreement in place to pay for that
chunk of the cost. [B1]
This is compounded by the fact that the Witness Intermediary Service, which
provides registered intermediaries to witnesses eligible via the statutory
scheme, does not serve the accused.105 Instead, the accused can only secure
non-registered intermediaries operating outside of this scheme. This is
despite the Divisional Court ruling that the defence should have access to
registered intermediaries, due to concerns that the quality of support
provided by non-registered intermediaries is inferior to that of registered
intermediaries.106 This is because the former are an unregulated entity, not
subject to a code of practice, code of ethics, or required to undertake
continual professional development as registered intermediaries are.107
The second point relating to resources concerns the typical defence
lawyer's working conditions. McConville et al. and Newman independently
found in their studies of defence solicitors that resource and financial
pressures result in discontinuous representation of clients.108 These strains
are magnified in times of austerity.109 Lawyers often juggle multiple cases at
once and may have to return briefs110 which other lawyers must pick up at
short notice. This means that a client may spend minimal, if any, time with
the solicitor or barrister who ultimately represents them at trial. They may
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even have been interviewed in the first instance by unqualified staff from the
solicitors' office due to resource constraints.111 These working conditions do
not make defence lawyers particularly well placed to identify vulnerability
and consider special measures. They may also make it easier for defence
lawyers to pass the buck for (failure to make) a special measures application
to someone else in the chain of legal representation a client receives.
The likelihood of a defence lawyer applying for special measures ± given
their unrestricted discretion over the matter, their working conditions, and
the limited resources at their disposal ± is further minimized if they think that
a trial will not go ahead due to the accused entering a guilty plea. Hawkins
notes that decisions can have `a strong anticipatory or predictive charac-
ter'.112 If, therefore, it is assumed that a trial will not go ahead, then an
application for special measures becomes futile. Since 24 per cent of cases
`crack',113 an early assumption that a defendant will plead guilty is neither
unfounded nor unreasonable. This is particularly so given that existing
research suggests that some criminal defence barristers seek to `crack' cases
before trial,114 sometimes due to financial incentives.115
CONCLUSION
By using Hawkins's theoretical framework, the experiences of the criminal
practitioners interviewed in this research is situated within their wider context.
This is helpful in understanding the notably different approach taken to
addressing issues surrounding vulnerability and trial adjustments for witnesses
for the prosecution and the accused. The article demonstrates that special
measures decision making is intrinsically bound up with the socio-political
surround and organizational field in which it is set. While the disparate legal
framework for accused and non-accused participants in criminal trials has
some bearing on the frequency with which special measures are invoked, this
research shows that several other issues influence such decisions.
The enactment of the YJCEA in the socio-political context of the victims'
agenda, and the initial exclusion of the accused from eligibility, has resulted
in a perception that special measures are a tool for the prosecution.
Responsibility for the uptake of special measures for prosecution witness is a
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public sector concern (and is thus subject to public sector forms of
accountability). The expectation that they are invoked where necessary, and
the subsequent organization of the legal field to ensure this, has served to
eradicate much of the discretion a criminal practitioner might have regarding
whether to apply for special measures, and if so, which one(s).
The perception that special measures (particularly live link and screens)
are for the prosecution can result in a view that they are largely irrelevant for
the accused. If anything, the defence is disincentivized to apply for special
measures, in part due to the perception that reliance on special measures is
indicative of incompetence as a defence lawyer. Furthermore, the defence's
uptake of special measures is a private matter overseen by independent legal
representatives.116 Absent the scrutiny to which the prosecution is subjected,
defence advocates have retained complete discretion over special measures
applications.
These findings shed significant light on the extent to which the socio-
political surround and the organization of the legal field affect the level of
discretion criminal practitioners have over decisions about special measures.
This means that changing the legal provision of special measures for accused
witnesses, to bring it in line with that for non-accused witnesses, will not
necessarily increase the proportion of them giving evidence using special
measures. Instead, several other changes to the legal field will need to
accompany this legal reform to reduce the extent of the defence's discretion
over how to proceed. This will enable vulnerable defendants to participate
effectively in their trials as witnesses117 using available special measures.
The first change to the legal field is specific training for defence
practitioners and the judiciary on the potential benefits of special measures
such as live link and screens for the accused. This will provide them with the
knowledge they need to make informed decisions about the appropriateness
of special measures, absent false assumptions that the accused's presence in
court negates their usefulness. This training will also need to address the
perceived tensions between the tactical approaches highlighted in this article
(and elsewhere) and the facilitation of a vulnerable accused's evidence. The
second change to the legal field suggested is a reformulation of the standard
special measures direction in line with this new understanding. This will
explain the use of special measures by the accused to jurors and should thus
begin to erode the defence's reluctance to adopt, and the jury's suspicion of,
such practice. While the perceptions and behaviour of advocates and judges
are firmly embedded within the system, the sea-change that we have seen
regarding vulnerable prosecution witnesses has arguably paved the way to its
extension for the accused.
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Another way to solicit special measures uptake by the accused is through
the advent of a comparable series of forms (like the MG forms) for the police
and defence solicitors, which prompt them at the pre-court stage to consider
the accused's vulnerability and the available special measures provision.
These changes to the legal field, along with an increase in resources, would
serve to place an expectation on the defence that special measures are
considered, something which is missing from the current landscape. They
may also encourage judges to question an advocate's failure to apply for
special measures if they think the accused is vulnerable.118 This would mean
that special measures decisions are not left solely to the defence legal team,
and thus limit the extent of discretion a defence advocate has in this area.
Finally, this article shows the value of Hawkins's framework in
unpacking the complexity of decision making within the criminal justice
system. Setting special measures decisions in their wider context enables a
fuller appreciation of the entanglement of issues at play, thus adding to our
understanding of an important but under-researched area of legal practice.
As Hawkins notes:
to see legal decisions as guided and constrained solely by existing legal rules
. . . is to ignore the social, political, and economic contexts in which those
decisions are made and the richness, subtlety, and complexity of all the
processes involved.119
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